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ABSTRACT
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT FOCUSING ON EFFECTIVE STRUCTURING 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTENRSHIPS
By
HyunJi Park
Infrastructure development is the integral part of social assets to generate substantial 
economic benefits to individual quality of life, enterprise’ quality of productivity, and broadly 
economic development based on transportation system, energy plant, logistic, electric and 
internet grid. It also contributes to job creation, ameliorated services and our lives. 
Infrastructure development requires long-term perspective and analysis of comprehensive
understanding from design, construction, finance, maintenance, to operation of infrastructure 
investment. Public-Private Partnerships in this regard enhance bilateral collaboration between 
public sector and private sectors. This research will review Public-Private Partnerships on 
infrastructure development on theoretical and empirical approach in the U.S. and Korean
project basis. The purpose of this study is to explore the effective structuring of Public-
Private Partnerships for infrastructure development enabling the optimal mixtures of 
concessionaries.
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CHAPTER I
INSTRUCTION
??
I. Introduction
?
“Infrastructure is the basic physical and organizational structure required for the operation 
of a society or enterprise (Oxford,2009)1” or “The service and facilities necessary for an 
economy to function (Sullivan,2003).2” Infrastructure refers to facilities supporting a society, 
such as roads, bridges, water supply, internet grids, electrical grids, telecommunications,
sewers etc. Also, “infrastructure can be defined as the physical components of interrelated 
systems providing commodities and services essential to enable, sustain, or enhance societal 
living conditions (Fulmer,Jeffrey,2009).”3
Infrastructure development has been at the core of economic development from 
developing countries to developed countries. For developing countries, many international 
finance institutions (e.g. Asian Development Bank, World Bank, etc.) spend as much as half 
of their total resources on infrastructure development. DFID(UK’s Department for 
International Development) spent nearly £1 billion on infrastructure in 2009-2010.4 Also,
developed countries’ infrastructure such as the United States has made it to the top of the 
political issue despite many distractions in the global economy.
The recent survey shows that 77 percent of boards of directors believe that “The current 
level of public infrastructure is inadequate to support their company’s long-term growth in 
the United States. These executives believe that infrastructure will become more important in 
???????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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determining where they are positioning their operations within next 5 years (KPMG, 2009).”5
The public sector also has awakened to the consequences of neglecting roads, public transit, 
bridge, internet grid, electricity grid and social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals.
According to a recent poll, 94 percent of Americans are concerned about the condition of the 
nation’s infrastructure. Remarkably, 81 percent respondents will pay 1 %t more willingly on 
their federal income tax to improve America’s infrastructure.6
Recently Korea is also in transition period to be deteriorated into aged facilities and 
infrastructures. Concentrated population in the cities according to the rapid economic growth
since 1960s, results in traffic jam, and unbalanced development in living environment. For 
instance, “Over the past three years, 53 sinkholes have been discovered on the roadway in 
across the nation including Seoul, Ulsan, Daejeon, Changwon and Suwon in Korea
(MaeKyung news, 2014).” 7 Infrastructure such as roads, public transit, bridges, internet grid 
and electricity grid is related with citizen’s safety, quality of life, and broadly economic 
improvement. The infrastructure investment is constant issues on a national level requiring 
financial resources.
In line with this, this research paper aims to explore the methods for infrastructure 
development through reviewing the case studies and Public Private Partnership (PPPs) 
models and interviewing experts.
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??
CHAPTER II
Theoretical Approach of Public-Private Partnerships
??
II. Theoretical Approach of Public-Private Partnerships
2-1. Public-Private Partnership
“A public–private partnership (PPP) is a government service or private business venture 
which is funded and operated through a partnership of government and one or more private 
sector companies.” “These schemes are sometimes referred to as PPP, P3 or P3s.8 PPP 
involves a contract between a public sector authority and a private party, in which the 
private party provides a public service or project and assumes substantial financial, 
technical and operational risk in the project (Barlow, J 2013).” 9
Typically, the process of financing on infrastructure is very similar with project financing 
on real estate investment. Project finance entails raising capital via loans, bonds or financial 
mechanisms. A private sector concessionaire setup the "special purpose company" (SPC) for
the infrastructure project to proceed design, build, finance, maintenance and operation.10
Typically the government has invested in the project in this cases, allotted an equity-share in 
the SPC.11 The consortium is consists of a bank lenders, equity investors, building contractor, 
maintenance or operation companies. The government contract with private partner,
subcontractors to build, to maintain, or to operate the infrastructure facilities. 
???????????????????????????????????????????
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In the infrastructure project, complicated contracts and arrangements that guarantee the 
future cash-flows can make PPPs projects prime candidates for project financing. A typical 
PPPs example is very similar with real estate development model. For example, to build 
hospital under the project financing and building developer can be a private sector and the 
hospital lease the authority to the private partner. “Then the private developer acts like
landlord, providing non-medical services and housekeeping while the hospital provides 
medical services by itself (Barlow J.2013)12.”
Even though private sector plays integral role in collaboration tool, PPPs model does not 
mean selling public assets or public facilities to private sector. PPPs can create more effective 
benefits for the public project taking risks and responsibilities including design, building,
equity investment(finance), operation, and maintenance (varies depends on the contracts 
condition). PPPs enables to accelerate the project implement by private sector’s resource, 
technical know-how, cut costs and controlling construction-delay. 
BENEFITS
Here are the primary benefits of PPPs: [1] PPPs projects are more likely to keep on-time 
and on-budget than traditional procurement for infrastructure development. (As late-delivery 
causes losses for private sector directly such as interest-costs, and labor costs.) Pre-
determined standard construction and maintenance services can deliver more precise social 
benefits. [2] PPPs enable open transaction sooner. The private sector provides up-front capital 
to complete project that is not subject to annual budget constraints of public debt caps. [3] 
Private partner fully or partially take some risks such as financial risks and construction 
???????????????????????????????????????????
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delay-related risks. In this regard, PPPs enable to transfer risks in a cost effectively. [4] In the 
case of that the private sector is responsible for operating and maintaining the asset, “The 
private sector has a strong incentive to minimize life cycle costs which means building to 
higher standard initially and timely maintenance through the life of a project. Public agencies 
may be unable to do this simply because of fiscal challenges (FHWA).”13
PPPs’ RISKs &  LIMITATION
There are also risks to PPPs projects. All of projects are not guaranteed to succeed no 
matter what PPPs enable to transfer risks to the private partners. PPPs can release the risks 
with controlling procurement, but there are always the potential risks that come with 
financing, constructing, and maintaining the infrastructure projects. Also, infrastructure 
projects are usually expected higher transaction cost due to financing costs, procurement 
expenses, and various fees. Here are primary possible risks that the private sectors were 
burdened:
[1] Delivering PPPs project accompanied by higher transaction costs. Infrastructure project 
and the procurement of long-term contracts are required with extensive due diligence and 
technical expertise. [2] Difficulty forecasting uncertain-things: Infrastructure development 
needs long-term view estimating uncertain-demand, financing, operations and maintenance. 
It is hard to estimate possible scenario with appropriate value of an agreement. [3] Higher 
finance costs: PPPs projects are typically financed with debt issued by institutional bank or 
public agencies. Private partner requires a competitive rate of return on investment.
?
???????????????????????????????????????????
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
??
2-2  Possible Public Private Partnerships Models
POSSIBLE  PPPs MODEL 1.?
In this regards, PPPs projects should be limited on typical projects expecting very stable 
revenue streams. In a developing country, most of small-scale infrastructure projects facilitate 
raising capitals via donor resources.
< Figure 1> Possible finance mechanism for small-scale infrastructure
Source: ?Local Finance Initiative (LFI)??A partnership between the UN Capital Development Fund and 
Global Clearinghouse for Development Finance.
“In 2009 a pooled financing approach designed for financing small scale of rural 
infrastructure on a multiple-sector basis was developed by the UNCDF ‘Local Finance
Initiative (LFI)’ as partnership with the GCDF(Global Clearinghouse for Development 
Finance).”14 This approach includes technical financial assistance, risk management and 
???????????????????????????????????????????
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incentives that can mobilize private sector’s finance tools,?institutional investors including 
banks, financial companies, pension funds, over the longer term. All the elements of this 
proposal have been tested in infrastructure financing programs carried out in many countries.
(UN,2012)15
POSSIBLE  PPPs MODEL 2.
The Florida Department of Transportation input a $1.8 billion 35 year concession with a 
private consortium in 2009, headed by the Spanish firm ACS Infrastructure Development, to 
build and operate high-occupancy toll lanes near Fort Lauderdale. The financing includes
$750 million in commercial bank debt; more than $200 million in equity; a $603 million loan 
from the federal TIFIA(Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act) program.
In this PPP, the FDOT will set rates of toll, retain all revenues sources from infrastructure
facility and form ?Availability Payments? to the private concessionaire annually out of all of 
its revenues including tax revenues, state appropriations and tolls.16 This project is the first 
U.S. toll road structured by ?Performance-Based Availability Payments? .In the “Availability
Payment Model”, revenue sources derived from a project retained by the public agency. The 
public agency pays periodical fees to the private partner under the PPPs agreement. It makes 
possible the private partners revenues not tolls but the public agencies’ fixed availability 
payment. Also, private partner can maximize funding; the ratio of debt to equity in a risky 
demand project 80/20; in Availability Payment Model the ratio can be 90/10.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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< Figure 2> Availability Payments Model
                                                                    Source: Deloitte
The public partner commits milestone payments to the private partner for the facility’s
maintenance and operation. Public sector as a grantor owns and retains strategic control of 
assets, also monitors PPPs’ agreement on an ongoing-basis while the private partners proceed 
the concession agreement project such as design, build, and maintenance, and operation. In 
the toll-project, the public sector retains the revenue resource, tolls. “To determine the 
amount of availability payment, private sector bidders submit bids based on the maximum 
annual payment they would require (FHWA,2012)17.”
But, it should be noted that this model transfer the demand risks are burden to the public 
partner than the private partner. If revenues are less than expected, the public sector make up 
for the deficit. If toll revenues are excess from the required availability payment, the public 
agency may choose to reinvest surplus income to the transportation system or to low tolls on 
the facility.
<Table1> Characteristics of Availability Payment vs Toll-based Revenue Risk
???????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
?
Source: Federation Highway Administration, U.S.
2-3 Legislation Issues for structuring Public-Private Partnership
At a March 2010, meeting of the National Conference for State Legislatures in Washington, 
D.C., participants agreed that legislative language should call for tools to consider the most 
effective procurement framework before a project is procured using any one particular 
approach. Without such legislation, counties, municipalities, regional transportation 
authorities, and even state agencies do not have the authority to move forward with the most 
effective method of procurement. This is especially true for public-private partnerships 
because they typically require transacting a structured finance deal.18
Legislation is necessary to enable PPPs as they typically require transaction structured 
finance deal. To implement Public-Private Partnership project successfully the government 
need to come up with legislation-grid between public sector and private sector. Public-Private 
Partnerships interact with political, real estate sophistication, finance, legislation and public 
???????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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policy. “In the United States, Public Private Partnerships in Transportation - a Toolkit for 
legislators developed by the National Conference of State Legislators - includes links to PPPs
enabling legislation in different states of the US. (National Conference of State Legislators)19”
PPPs enabling legislation varies among States, but the key features by states are the same as 
follows:
< Table 2> Key Features on PPP-enabling legislation by state
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis based on Federal Highway Administration and US 
Department of Transportation data
PROCURMENT &  STATUTORY PROVISIONS
???????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
While traditional procurements often require uniform bid packages to candidate bidders, 
PPPs contract may be included in enabling legislation which permits nonconventional 
procurement process with 4 provision types:
[1] Permissible Types of Procurement Methods: PPP proposals including:
??Unsolicited proposals: Some States allow unsolicited proposals for potential PPPs 
projects which allow private sectors to propose solutions related transportation issues. 
Unsolicited proposals can contribute to delivery solution that the public sector might 
not be considered while the private sector may tends to propose high financial return 
project rather than the government regional plan or public purpose.20
??Competitive Request for Qualifications (RFQs) and Requests for Proposal(REPs),
??Negotiations with the winning bidders, and
??Best and final offers.
[2] Allowable Types of Payment and Fees: Some States require bidders to pay fees the costs 
of proposal review.21
??Application Fees: If unsolicited proposals are allowed, application fees can be useful
tool to help defray the costs incurred by public sponsors in reviewing the unsolicited 
proposals.
??Performance Security: “State law requires a contract performance security, which is a 
financial guarantee made by a contractor to a States.”(FHWA)
??Stipends: “This is kind of government funding for bidders involving in PPPs projects. 
PPPs projects require design, finance, construction, and operation. Some States allow 
stipends for qualified bidders to increase competition by encouraging more
bidders.”(FHWA) Also, Stipends can used to compensate losing bidders.
[3] Proposal Evaluation Criteria: Some states like Texas describe legislation criteria when
proposals are evaluated such as PPPs program policy and guideline. PPPs statutes permit 
the criteria based on the best value rather than low bid. Value considerations include: the 
???????????????????????????????????????????
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bidder’s qualification, experience, and key staff; the quality of the proposed technical 
solution; the operations and maintenance plan; and the project’s lifecycle costs.22
[4] Confidentiality and Transparency: “While public disclosure of proposal details can 
help improve the transparency and public 235 legitimacy of the bidding process, full 
transparency may deter private sector bids. Legislation may 236 establish a process 
whereby private bidders identify confidential and proprietary information that 237 should 
be excluded from disclosure.”(FHWA)
AGREEMENT  PROVISIONs
Enabling legislation prescribe specific parameter for contract provision in PPPs agreement.
< Table3 > Potential Statutory Restrictions on Agreement Provisions
??????????????? ????????????
Risk Allocation Require defined process for accessing and allocating risk.
Payment/Revenue -Limit toll rate increases
-Designate a public agency to determine/approve rate increases
-Require revenue sharing provisions
Term Length Limit contract term length to specified number of years.
Non-compete clauses Forbid broad non-compete clauses
Review of final agreement -Require legislative review/approval of final PPPs agreements
-Designate committee or commission responsible for final 
approval
Source: Federation Highway Administration, U.S.
Furthermore, “There are tradeoffs associated with some legal decision, particularly where 
public and private concerns can conflict, such as transparency and competition to require in 
the procurement process and the level of public and legislative input to allow in the 
decision-making process (Federation Highway Association, U.S)23.”
2-4  5 Components of an Infrastructure Project & Type of Partnerships
???????????????????????????????????????????
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According to the public sector’s needs of infrastructure scope, the private sectors 
participate project via DBF(Design, Build, Finance) or DBFOM(Design, Build, Finance, 
Operation, Maintenance). Most infrastructure development projects are composed of 5 
components: design, construction, finance, operation, and maintenance. The details are as 
follows:
<Table4> 5 components of an infrastructure project
??????????? ?????????
Design.?
?
Under virtually any partnership structure the responsibility for design will 
be shared. For instance, even in partnership structures with high degrees 
of private responsibility, the public sector’s articulation of performance 
specifications will limit the range of design options. In many projects, the 
need to ensure compliance with broader planning and environmental 
guidelines results in a significant degree of public sector design.?
Build/Construction? This component includes the construction of the physical asset(s) over a 
prescribed period of time, generally at a prescribed cost. Deciding which 
party assumes the impact of construction cost overruns and time delays 
must be considered.?
Operation? Operating the asset may include various activities from general 
management of service provision and revenue collection to performing 
soft (or non-core) services associated with an asset, such as laundry 
services within a hospital. Operation typically begins at the end of 
construction, upon agreement that the construction has been satisfactory. 
In PPPs, the private partner’s compensation is dependent on the 
achievement of performance standards.?
Ongoing 
Maintenance?
Generally, there are two principal types of maintenance to be considered 
in any infrastructure project: ongoing regular maintenance (or operating 
maintenance), and major refurbishment, often called life-cycle or capital 
maintenance.?
Finance? This component generally includes financing for the capital costs of 
construction, as well as working capital requirements.24?
Source: Deloitte
TYPES  of  PARTNERSHIPS
The types of partnerships are various depending on the components; design, build, 
???????????????????????????????????????????
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finance, operation, and maintenance. The below definitions of partnership types were from
“Public-Private Partnerships: Terms Related to Building and Facility Partnerships
(Government Accounting Office, April 1999).”
<Table5> Types of Partnerships2526?
O&M (Operations and Maintenance) : A public partner (federal, state, or local government 
agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to provide and/or maintain a specific service. 
Under the private operation and maintenance option, the public partner retains ownership and 
overall management of the public facility or system.
OMM (Operations, Maintenance & Management): A public partner (federal, state, or local 
government agency or authority) contracts with a private partner to operate, maintain, and 
manage a facility or system proving a service. Under this contract option, the public partner 
retains ownership of the public facility or system, but the private party may invest its own capital 
in the facility or system. Any private investment is carefully calculated in relation to its
contributions to operational efficiencies and savings over the term of the contract. Generally, the 
longer the contract term, the greater the opportunity for increased private investment because 
there is more time available in which to recoup any investment and earn a reasonable return. 
Many local governments use this contractual partnership to provide wastewater treatment 
services
DB (Design-Build): A DB is when the private partner provides both design and construction of a 
project to the public agency. This type of partnership can reduce time, save money, provide 
stronger guarantees and allocate additional project risk to the private sector. It also reduces 
conflict by having a single entity responsible to the public owner for the design and construction.
The public sector partner owns the assets and has the responsibility for the operation and 
maintenance
DBM (Design-Build-Maintain): A DBM is similar to a DB except the maintenance of the 
facility for some period of time becomes the responsibility of the private sector partner. The 
benefits are similar to the DB with maintenance risk being allocated to the private sector partner 
and the guarantee expanded to include maintenance. The public sector partner owns and operates 
the assets.
DBO (Design-Build-Operate): The DBO method of contracting is contrary to the separated and 
sequential approach ordinarily used in the United States by both the public and private sectors. 
This method involves one contract for design with an architect or engineer, followed by a
different contract with a builder for project construction, followed by the owner’s taking over the 
project and operating it. A simple design-build approach creates a single point of responsibility 
for design and construction and can speed project completion by facilitating the overlap of the 
design and construction phases of the project. On a public project, the operations phase is 
normally handled by the public sector under a separate operations and maintenance agreement. 
Combining all three passes into a DBO approach maintains the continuity of private sector 
involvement and can facilitate private-sector financing of public projects supported by user fees 
generated during the operations phase.
DBFOM (Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain): With the Design-Build-Finance-Operate-
???????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Maintain (DBFOM) approach, the responsibilities for designing, building, financing, operating 
and maintaining are bundled together and transferred to private sector partners. There is a great 
deal of variety in DBFOM arrangements in the United States, and especially the degree to which 
financial responsibilities are actually transferred to the private sector. One commonality that cuts 
across all DBFOM projects is that they are either partly or wholly financed by debt leveraging 
revenue streams dedicated to the project. Direct user fees (tolls) are the most common revenue 
source. However, others ranging from lease payments to shadow tolls and vehicle registration 
fees. Future revenues are leveraged to issue bonds or other debt that provide funds for capital and 
project development costs. They are also often supplemented by public sector grants in the form 
of money or contributions in kind, such as right-of-way. In certain cases, private partners may be 
required to make equity investments as well. Value for money can be attained through life-cycle 
costing.
BOT ( Build-Operate-Transfer): The private partner builds a facility to the specifications 
agreed to by the public agency, operates the facility for a specified time period under a contract 
or franchise agreement with the agency, and then transfers the facility to the agency at the end of 
the specified period of time. In most cases, the private partner will also provide some, or all, of 
the financing for the facility, so the length of the contract or franchise must be sufficient to enable 
the private partner to realize a reasonable return on its investment through user charges. At the 
end of the franchise period, the public partner can assume operating responsibility for the facility,
contract the operations to the original franchise holder, or award a new contract or franchise to a 
new private partner. The BTO model is similar to the BOT model except that the transfer to the 
public owner takes place at the time that construction is completed, rather than at the end of the 
franchise period.
BOT ( Build-Operate-Transfer): The private partner builds a facility to the specifications 
agreed to by the public agency, operates the facility for a specified time period under a contract 
or franchise agreement with the agency, and then transfers the facility to the agency at the end of 
the specified period of time. In most cases, the private partner will also provide some, or all, of 
the financing for the facility, so the length of the contract or franchise must be sufficient to enable 
the private partner to realize a reasonable return on its investment through user charges. At the 
end of the franchise period, the public partner can assume operating responsibility for the facility, 
contract the operations to the original franchise holder, or award a new contract or franchise to a 
new private partner. The BTO model is similar to the BOT model except that the transfer to the 
public owner takes place at the time that construction is completed, rather than at the end of the 
franchise period.
BOO (Build-Own-Operate): The contractor constructs and operates a facility without 
transferring ownership to the public sector. Legal title to the facility remains in the private sector, 
and there is no obligation for the public sector to purchase the facility or take title. A BOO 
transaction may qualify for tax-exempt status as a service contract if all Internal Revenue Code 
requirements are satisfied.
BBO (Buy-Build-Operate): A BBO is a form of asset sale that includes a rehabilitation or 
expansion of an existing facility. The government sells the asset to the private sector entity, 
which then makes the improvements necessary to operate the facility in a profitable manner
Source: The National Council for Public Private Partnership?
2-5 Typical Revenue Sources
Project revenues of PPPs are various. Revenue sources are the key criteria to estimate the 
future value. Future revenues are closely related with financial-debt issued by commercial 
???
banks or institutional investors, if concessions can’t deliver 100% equity investment on the 
project. Typical revenue sources are State and local gas and sales taxes, as well as Federal aid 
funds. “PPPs may also be structured to take advantage of non-traditional revenue sources 
such as local option taxes, parking and other fees, tax increment financing, and tax 
assessment districts.”(FHWA)27 But, at the point of revenue stability, traditional revenue 
sources such as State and local gas and sales taxes are considered more likely stable than 
local option taxes. So, this perception can be derived typical type of revenue sources are 
easier to get leverage than the new-types of revenue sources.
<Table6> Typical PPPs Revenue Sources (exclude revenue source from equity and debt)
??????????????? ??????????? ??????????????
Tolls Direct user fee, may create 
stronger performance incentives 
for a facility operator. 
Revenue risk can be transferred 
to the private sector. 
Tolling structure may include 
market pricing mechanisms that 
create economic benefits. 
Traffic and revenue forecasts can fall 
short of actual revenues. 
Use of additional toll revenues may be 
constrained within pre-defined limits of 
the corridor to address geographic equity 
concerns. 
Few facilities can be fully financed on toll 
revenues alone; recent experience shows 
that most projects will require a 
combination of revenue sources to work. 
Costs of collection may be higher than 
other revenue sources. 
State fuel taxes Indirect user fee. Revenues are 
not directly associated with the 
use of a specific project, but 
related to general use of 
highway network, therefore
they may be relatively stable. 
Low cost of collection. 
Yield declining over time since they
typically do not increase in line with 
inflation and improved fuel efficiency and 
introduction/growth of alternative fuels 
lead to lower fuel usage. 
Significant demand from competing 
priorities/interests. 
Federal-aid 
highway funds 
and 
discretionary 
funds
Derived from federal fuel 
taxes—a relatively stable 
revenue source and an indirect 
user fee. 
Yield declining over time, see above. 
Federal funds are generally linked to 
regulations and contracting requirements 
(e.g., NEPA, Davis-Bacon, etc.) that may 
be more demanding than the requirements 
of other revenue sources. 
Once obligated or awarded, Federal 
funds, grants and earmarks must be used 
within a specific timeframe (generally 
???????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
three years). 
Sales taxes Relatively stable revenue 
source, though subject to 
influence of economic growth 
and recession. 
May create market distortions because it 
is not aligned with the “user pays” 
concept. 
Some of the local option taxes or those 
dedicated for specific uses may have a 
“sunset” date that may or may not be 
aligned with the length of the P3 
agreement. 
Value capture
Impact fees
Special 
assessments
Tax increments
Development 
contributions
Joint development 
/development 
rights
May capture economic value 
created through infrastructure 
improvements that is not 
captured by other 
sources. 
Value capture options can be 
chosen based on regional/local 
conditions and project needs. 
Subject to the volatility of the real estate 
market. Rated low by bond rating 
agencies. 
Yield may be low for major projects; 
likelihood of requiring other revenue 
sources is higher. 
There can be concerns about the public 
sector being a “landlord.” 
Policy issues related to eminent domain 
takings (if any required for the project) 
being turned over to the private sector for 
profit. 
Ancillary 
revenues
Rest stops
Utility/fiber optics 
on highway right-
of-way
Advertising
Air rights
Encourage private sector to 
optimize potential revenue 
options, reducing the need for 
limited public resources 
Yield is relatively low; cannot be 
considered as standalone funding sources, 
but as part of the “revenue portfolio.” 
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federation Highway Administration
Additionally today’s value is not as same as tomorrow’s. The value of revenue sources is
changeable due to the industrial trend, environmental changes, and new technology 
inventions. For example, the main revenue source of highway investment project is fuel-
taxes, but if alternative fuels are used or electricity cars are popular, the revenue will decline.
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CHAPTER III
Case Study 1. Florida 1-595 Corridor Roadway Improvement Project
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III. Case Study 1. Florida 1-595 Corridor Roadway Improvement Project
For infrastructure development, Public-Private Partnership Concessions became a vital 
role in delivery projects. In the United States, Public-Private Partnership concessions have 
been implemented briskly to develop tunnels, bridges, roadways, lanes, and expressways
since 2005.
< Figure 3 > PPP Concessions in the US
Source: Federal Highway Administration
WHY SELECTED THIS CASE
Considering all of the criteria from <Table2> <Figure 3>,<Figure 4>, Florida States in 
the United States is the best example to study Public-Private Partnership for infrastructure
development at the points of familiar-PPPs environment in legislation, on-operation, needs 
fulfillment, and quality grade assigned by Pew Center on the states.
???
< Figure 4> Meeting Infrastructure needs in an ongoing challenge for states
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis based on Federal Highway Administration             
and US Department of Transportation data
???? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation shows the 
description of Florida I-595 roadway Improvement Project as follows:, The I-595 corridor 
was opened to traffic in 1989 to coordinate high traffic-volumes between the western part of 
the Southeast Florida with the established north-south freeway and principal roadways to the 
east, including I-75, Florida's Turnpike, SR 7, I-95 and US 1. However, travel demand for 
using the corridor has increased to reach the highway in the short term. The I-595 Corridor
Roadway Improvements project included [1] Roadway improvement on the mainline of I-595 
[2] Roadway improvement on Ramps from the I-75/Saw grass expressway interchange to the 
I-595/I-95 interchange [3] Widening mainline of I-595. The Federal Highway Administration, 
U.S. Department of Transportation describes this project as follows: The project passes 
through, or lies adjacent to, six jurisdictions: City of Fort Lauderdale City of Sunrise;; City of 
Plantation; Town of Dania; Town of Davie and unincorporated areas of Broward County. A
???
major component of the project is the construction of three at-grade reversible express toll 
lanes to be known as 595 Express, serving express traffic to/from the I-75/Sawgrass 
Expressway from/to east of SR 7, with a direct connection to the median of Florida's 
Turnpike. These lanes will be operated as managed lanes with variable tolls to optimize 
traffic flow, and will reverse directions in peak travel times (eastbound in the AM and 
westbound in the PM). The project is being proceed as a concessionaire between FDOT and a 
private partner from design, build, finance, operation, to maintenance in the roadway for 35
years period. FDOT will provide management oversight of the contract; will install, test, 
operate and maintain all tolling equipment for the express lanes; and will set the toll rates and 
maintain the tolls.28
< Figure 5> Project Location 
Source:?Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
???????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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This project delivered all of the process, DBFOM( (Design, Build, Finance, Operate, and 
Maintain)method by private sector, which construction began in June 2009; substantial
completion was achieved on March 26, 2014.
< Table7> Description of I-595 Florida Corridor Roadway Improvement 
Private Partner ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ? ? ?
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Project Advisors / 
Consultants
???????????? ?????????????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????????????????????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????????????????????????
??????????? ? ? ?? ????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????????????????????????????????
Lenders ????????????????????????????????
????????????
Duration / Status ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????
TIFIA Credit 
Assistance
??????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????
Financial Status ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
?????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
Innovations ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????
Source:?Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation?
?
???? ??????????????????????????????
In the case of “Florida I-595 Corridor Roadway Improvements Project” FDOT asked 
stringent Statement of Qualifications (SOQ) and Project Information Memorandum (PIM) for 
the candidate teams. In response, 6 teams submitted SOQ on November 5, 2007 describing 
their track-record, technical strongest, and financial depth. Expert panels judged a double-
blind evaluation at the point of independence and transparency. The group of panels, scoring 
committee scores to each team using adjectival scoring process. On December 3, 2007, 
FODOT selected 4short-list proposers who submitted SOQs:
???
< Table8> Procurement Structure of “Florida I-595 Roadway Improvement Project”
? ?
?
Source: Federation Department of Transportation
On February 11, 2008, ?Direct Connect Partners? withdrew from biddier-consideration
and 2 days prior to bid submission, ?I-595 Development Partners? announced that they would 
not be submitting a proposal. So remaining two teams participated on bidding process, which 
were ?ACS Dragados-Macquarie Partnership?, and ?Express Access Team?. ACSID were
responsible for 100% full-equity investment and Macquarie was in charge of financial 
advisor. The other team, Express Access Team had 2 equity members, ?Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure Fund North America (BBIFNA)? and ?Bilfinger Berger Project Investment Inc.?
???
< Table9> Final Bidders of “Florida I-595 Roadway Improvement Project
On October 24, 2008, ACSID was selected as the best proposer. ACSID offer a MAP 
$63,980,000 while EAT proposed a MAP $144,497,830. EAT achieved a higher score on 
technical perspectives, but EAT’s financial feasibility score was lower than ACSID’s. As 
EAT was insufficient to overcome the cost different comparing with ACSID.
???? ??????????????????????????????
The Federation Department of Transportation in Florida considered PPPs as a vehicle for
both the financial and risk aspects. At first time, Federation Department of Transportation 
in Florida separated the I-595 improvement projects into several contract packages to be 
delivered during construction period. But, FDOT determined to make the one single 
construction-contract packaging to cover all of the I-595 infrastructure separated project and
to provide financing mechanism for this project. ?This single contract could deliver the road 
improvement project about 15 years earlier than under traditional pay-as-you-go 
procurements.?(Jeffery A. 2006) Accelerated delivery made it possible cost-efficiencies in 
terms of less-disruption to traffic jam due to the construction-related lane closure, less-
???
confusion from ordering raw materials to managing construction, and less-interest cost 
regarding financial issue. To say details, ?the first funding option considered was a Design-
Build-Finance (DBF) procurement authorized under Public-Private Partnership legislation 
approved by the Florida Legislation in 2004. Using DBF procurement could let a single 
contract to complete the project in 3-5years. The contractor would earn payment as 
construction?s milestones are reached but FDOT would not be paid until the future work 
program allocations. For raising fund, the contractor or third party should finance the future 
payment (Jeffery A.2009).?29 FDOT also considered a. DBFOM contract includes design, 
construction, financing, operation and maintenance for the project. ?Financing includes both 
debt and equity, which a concessionaire derives revenue from the long-term project assuming
higher risks. DBFOM must get profit via ongoing performance over the contract such as 
annual availability payments, future toll revenue (Jeffery A.2009).30? DBF is a receivables 
structure for design-build process payment once earned, which are not risky for future 
performance. But, DBFOM offers the opportunity to complete construction to earn a future 
revenue steam, whereas a DBF is just design-build-finance contract with delayed milestone 
payments.31 FDOT realized that DBFOM contract is much more attractive than DBF for 
potential concessionaires. Also, FODT intended that DBROM enables to achieve lifecycle
cost efficiency in terms of long term operation and maintenance by the private sector.
???????????????????????????????????????????
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???? ????????????????? ? ???????????????????????????????”
“Availability Payments Model” is used for tolling is infeasible long-term project costs
Availability payments also used if the public sector wants to retain demand risk since the 
potential private partners are reluctant to take risks. “The I-595 697 Express Toll Lanes 
Project is an availability payment project where the public sector is responsible for collecting
toll revenue, but relies on other sources as the basis for its long-term responsibility to pay the 
concessionaire. Availability payments may be paid from the State transportation trust 700 
fund and Florida Turnpike Enterprise. Toll revenues offset the obligations from these 
sources.”(FHWA, 2012)32?One of the reasons FDOT selected “Availability Payments Model”
was to manage toll rates to optimize mobility along roadway. Availability payments contract
can be more attractive for potential private investors to avoid form the demand risk or lack of
revenue sources. Availability payment enables to be easier to raise capital and allows the 
equity investors, which the private partner can focus on delivering construction, maintenance 
and operation of the project.
Also, to ensure stable Availability Payment Model, Florida States limited on obligation to 
prevent public sector as follows:
Florida’s Limitations on P3 Obligations: “When Florida authorized the use of P3s, it 
explicitly limited the amount of funding that can be obligated for future payments to 15 
percent of its five-year work program. This is one potential mechanism to prevent public 
agencies from over-committing future resources to P3 projects.”
? ?????????????????????????????????????????
FDOT statuettes 2 provisions on PPPs’s Availability Payments as following:?
???????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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< Table10 > FDOT’s Provisions on PPP’s Availability Payments               
1 “The annual payments under such agreement shall be included in the department’s 
tentative work program… and the long-range transportation plan for the applicable 
metropolitan planning organization… The department shall ensure that annual payments 
on multiyear public-private partnership agreements are prioritized ahead of new 
capacity projects in the development and updating of the tentative work program” 
2 “The annual payments are subject to annual appropriation by the Legislature as 
provided in the General Appropriations Act in support of the first year of the tentative 
work program.” 
Source: FDOT
The Florida I-595 project allocated risks by PPPs. Risk Matrices, <Table8> chart show 
that who retain the risk and which risk was shared in PPPs. In case of Florida I-595 project, 
clearly defining the public sector’s role and the private sector’s responsibility allowed the 
effective risk management for the project. As risk allocation require multiple cooperation
between the public partner and the private partner
<Table11> Florida I-595 Express Lanes Risk Allocation (Risk Matrices)
Source: Florida Department of Transportation
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IV. Case Study 2. “Incheon International Airport Expressway”
Project in Korea 
4-1. Korean Infrastructure Development’s Brief History
?
Korea has demonstrated a remarkable record of economic performance since the early 
1960s. Most of economic success is related with infrastructure development. In the between 
the early 1960s and the late 1980s, Korea realized sizable economic benefits from 
infrastructure investments. Several factors enabled this innovative changes; “Strong 
leadership and efficient coordination for installing the infrastructure necessary to spur 
economic performance, a well-defined focus and priorities on infrastructure development, 
and willingness and flexibility were the critical factors (Reinfeld, 1997).”
At Korea's first 5Year Development Plan (1962-1966), infrastructure development on 275 
km of railways and highway projects made it possible to import substitution capacity.
The second Five-Year Development Plan (1967-1971), the period which grew economic 
growth about 50 percent per year, infrastructure development was accelerated especially on
railway, and highway. The third Five-Year Development Plan (1972-1976), Korean
government initiated integral parts of economic development, social infrastructure including 
the 487km of highway project, Seoul subway system, major port project in Busan, and 
Inchon.
4-2. Recent Korean Issues about Infrastructure Development
? ? ?Korean infrastructure projects have been challenged by Korean government and 
private equity investment. Korea is one of the nations around the world subject to 
famous for its fast modernization and advanced infrastructure. Infrastructure development 
can be expected to generate substantial economic benefits.  Expressways all around Korean 
???
territory have accommodated the growing numbers of cars in the Korea. It also provides 
people an excellent land transportation services by maintaining KTX trains possible internet-
grid and bus facilities. Air transportation also has a remarkable development over the past 
years. Aside from international airports in Incheon, Pusan and Jeju Island, some domestic 
airports were opened to serve not only local citizens but also the vast number of tourists 
visiting the country. It contributes the growth of visitors in Korea. The expansion on ports 
and harbor is also one of the major projects Korea has focused on in response to its growing 
economy. The same is true for power-generated facilities and telecommunication services. 
<Table12>Visitor Arrivals, International Tourism Receipts & Expenditures in Korea
Source: Korean Tourism Organization (Growth %)
These improvements and developments wouldn't in any way be possible without the joint 
efforts of the government and private sectors. For years, Korean infrastructure projects have 
been carried out through Korean government and private equity investment. Here is the list of 
recent infrastructure projects all over the country
???
< Figure 6 > Infrastructure Development PPPs’ Cases in Korea 
Source: Macquarie IR
PPPs projects have contributed to be balanced development in Korean territory and its 
growing economy in respect to its transportation system. But, behind the good intentions to 
improve the Korean infrastructure, some problems later arose from these projects.
4-3 “Incheon International Airport Expressway” Project
The “Incheon International Airport Expressway” project was initiated by government-
financed basis under “the Act on Promotion of Private Capital Investment in Social 
Overhead Capital” in 1994. In1995, the government reformed the financial structure by 
participating the private sectors to ease raising capitals for the expressway construction. 
???
<Figure7>Incheon International Airport Expressway
The “Incheon International Airport 
Expressway” project implemented Public-
Private Partnerships flows, which the 
concessionaire was consists of 11 
construction companies. The government 
selected BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) 
clause on concession agreement. In 2000,
the completed expressway has been 
refinanced, and current ratio of equity holders are 24.1% of MKIF(Macquarie Korea 
Infrastructure Fund), and most of other equity-holders are institutional investors.
<Table13> “Incheon International Airport Expressway “Project
?????????
Project Name New Airport Hiway Co., Ltd. (NAHC),
Concessionaire of Incheon Airport Express
Type of Partnerships BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate)
Total project cost 1,334 billion KW
Capital structure Equity 25% Debt59% Construction Subsidy 16%
Length 40.2 kilometers, 8 lanes
Construction period November 1995–November 2000
Operational period 30 Years
Minimum Revenue Guarantee 80%, 20 years
Revenue Cap* (*Partial revenue sharing 
in excess of 80% to 110% level
110% of annual CA projected revenue
Current phase In Operation
Current Equity Consortium (2014) *MKIF 24.1% , Subordinated Loan 51.7billion KRW 
*(MKIF: Macquarie Korea Infrastructure Fund)
Tolls 7,600 KW (small vehicle)
Competent authority Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
Source: KDI(Korean Development Institution), Macquarie Infrastructure Fund
???
4-4 Financial Approach to Private Consortium
< Table 13> shows that how the private consortium raised financial sources to invest PPPs’
projects. In case of NAHC(Incheon International Airport Expressway), the project’s capital 
is consist of 58.2% Equity( including 24.1% equity of MKIF) and 51.7% Subordinated Debt,
which means equity holders and subordinated debt owners are institutional investors such as 
IB(Investment banking), commercial bank, pension or, and insurance companies. MKIF 
should pay highly interest-cost since subordinated debt usually requires highly interest rate 
for the debt-owners located lower ranking of debt-ownership repayment. Why MKIF chose 
the debt instead of equity? Raising high interest costs means 4 possibilities for debt issuer, 
MKIF as follows:
<Table14>The Private Partners Consortium: Equity/Debt 
Unit: Billion (KW)
Source: MKIF(Macquarie Korea Infrastructure Fund)
???
[1] Tax-deduction: If the project earns high-yield from revenue sources, the private partner 
should pay income-tax to the government. By issuing debt, in this case high-cost 
subordinated debt; it enables tax-deduction via raising cost on balance sheet, while 
issuing stocks can’t offer tax-effects.
[2] MKIF reluctant to dilute existing shareholders by issuing equity. As MKIF has 24.1% 
of equity ownership, they want to protect their shelter.
[3] “In the Bottom of the Bag” : Infrastructure development require substantial funding. To 
raise capital, firm usually increase the ratio of equity issuing stocks or progress 
IPO(initial public offering) but possibly MKIF were under the difficulty to raise capital 
for the large-size scale of infrastructure investment with long-term. 
[4] In downsizing market, high interest income such as subordinated debt or bond will be 
more attractive than low-value equity shares for investors.
4-5 Demand Risk & Financial Risk
The possible volume of PPPs’ leveraging and most of financial future cash flows can be 
derived from forecasting demand using infrastructure facilities. PPPs benefits that the public 
sector effectively transfers demand risks to the private sectors, which are related with 
financial risk. Infrastructure projects usually require debt-financing mortgaged from future 
revenue sources such as tolls and taxes. The private sector can achieve financial leverage on 
infrastructure investment with willingness than the public sector. As “the private partner may 
be achieve greater financial leverage on a project by being more willing to accept 
projections of higher revenues or lower cost or financing projects at lower coverage levels 
???
than the public sector(FHWA, 2012).”
The public sector would be less aggressive to take financial risks than the private 
investors since private investors can get leverage effect from debt financing project while the 
financial risk affect to public sector’s operation and maintenance. And these financial risks 
derived directly from the demand risks, which some of Korean infrastructure projects resulted 
in default. If demand for using facilities like; expressway, roadway, bridge and subway;
are less than expected, the private investors lose their investment (sometimes extend to 
commercial bank’s bankrupt) and infrastructure project will not be materialized.
“In recent years, potential project investors have been more reluctant to accept a high 
degree of demand risk. Many P3 agreements in the United States now include revenue 
sharing agreements and a mix of public and private financing. Some P3 agreements use 
availability payments, where the public sector pays the private sector an agreed upon 
annual or monthly fee for meeting performance standards set in the agreement
(FHWA, 2012).”
Despite of this private sector’s strength in funding, Korean Infrastructure projects in PPPs’
flows have been under default (in fact) from the surplus estimation of facility demand.
“A current issue regarding the failure of Macquarie infra-fund project enhanced major 
infrastructure investment, gave negative perspectives to Korean and Korean government. 
There is one more issue, if the private partner will progress the project such as 
operation, maintenance, the charging fees will be increased. Reflecting this public 
sentiment, SOC projects have barriers if project can’t guarantee the stable profits for 
certain for the private investors.” (On interview with Hyun W. Woori Bank IB)
< Table15> Average Daily Traffic Volume of PPPs’ Projects
???
Source: Macquarie Infrastructure Fund
This chart describe that the average daily traffic volume in Public-Private
Partnerships’’ projects recently. In 2014, Average daily traffic volume of Incheon 
International Airport Expressway, was 60,030 - 65,155 vehicles/day. With this demand 
number, it is possible to estimate the future revenue. But, there is the fundamental
problem Korean government faces, which is the PPP’s project s size of volume are
extraordinary bigger than the actual needs. So it will be require finding out the other 
method, plan B to fulfill the revenue recourse at the point of the government’s
perspective.   The failure to gauge the actual size of demand for toll gates and 
expressways brought loss to the private investors, (but in case of ‘Macquarie 
Infrastructure fund’, the private partner came up with an limited agreement, Minimum 
Revenue guarantee (MRG) from Korean government.) The actual losses of the projects 
are at the shouldered by Korean taxpayers.
4-6 Minimum Revenue Guarantee Agreement
???
[1] The Background of Korean MRG (Minimum Revenue Guarantee)
<Figure 8> Rate of Return for Signed BTO Road Construction Projects (%)
Source: KDI
Since the Public Private Partnerships Act in 1998, ROR(Rate of Return)33of project 
diminished gradually from 9.12% (2000yr) to 5.13%(2008yr) according to the KDI data.  To 
promote the construction and to support the operation for the private partners, the Korean 
government offered subsidies to the private partners called “Minimum Revenue Guarantee”
during construction and operation-period. MRG is an attractive clause for the private partners,
which enables to transfer high-risk and burden of uncertainty from the infrastructure 
development to the government. “The government guaranteed private investors a certain 
minimum percentages of expected revenue of a project. If revenues are under the guaranteed 
level, the government filled up the gap. Vice versa the government had the right to redeem 
revenue above a certain revenue level based on project revenue (ADB, 2011)34.
But, the MRG program for unsolicited projects was ended in 2006 since the Korean
government should take burden of fiscal risks from the uncertainty; also had a difficulty
???????????????????????????????????????????
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
estimating benefits and costs. 
<Table16> Total Amount of MRG Subsidies for Project in Operation by Year (billion KW)
Source: The Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea
As this chart, the amounts of MRG/year have been increased remarkably in Korea since 
2006.  Though the MRG subsidies ended for unsolicited project, the government was on still 
requiring the subsidies from the private company due to the valid MRG agreement until the 
system ended. (The actual size of demand for the early projects was about 50% of expected 
demand.) After completing the projects’ construction, more projects would move to the next 
phase, the operational step, which step has potential possibility to increase more MRG.35
[2] MRG Agreement with Macquarie Infrastructure Fund
At the “Minimum Revenue Guarantee Agreements” between Korean government and 
private partners Macquarie Infrastructure Fund have set a legal obligation with Korean 
government to recover the case of that the private operator generated losses from the certain 
level. Here is the MRG Agreement list of Macquarie Infrastructure Fund.
< Table 17> 2014 MRG Agreement List of ?Macquarie Infrastructure Fund? in Korea 
???????????????????????????????????????????
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????????????????
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Source: Macquarie Infrastructure Fund
The chart shows that ratio of MRG offered to MKIF (Macquarie Korea Infrastructure Fund)
depending on the projects. In case of “Incheon International Expressway” project, MKIF 
cossesionarie agreed on 80% of minimum guarantees for 20 years from the government, while 
the government was entitled to receive the revenue above a 110% of the threshold of project 
revenue. MRG Agreement will be valid on these 12 projects until the next 17years on average.
Considering at the point of ‘the failure of forecasting-demand’, MRG Agreement has been
financial burden to the Korean government. Korean government has filled the loss-gap between 
the actual revenue and minimum-revenue threshold.  The government has taken almost all of 
risks paying high and strongly-stable revenue, MRG to the private partner.
< Table 18> Actual Subsidy Paid in 8 Infrastructure Projects (%, Billion KW)
???
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea
Table 3-3 The chart shows the projected traffic volume and actual MRG subsidies paid to the 
private partners in Korean infrastructure projects. The chart shows that the actual ratio of MRG 
offered to the private partners during 2001-2007. For example, in case of “Incheon 
International Expressway” project, the actual traffic volumes have not reached 80% of 
minimum threshold during 2001-2007 remarkably. Defaulted project has been forced to 
compensate losses to Korean government from 59.1 to 80.8 billion won depending on the 
minimum revenue guarantee. According to the recent report, Hankyoreh New(2013),
“ Incheon Airport Expressway, 406.6 billion(US$406.6million) won were paid by taxpayers 
to make up the losses, and the project “which holds 100% of the shares in section one of the 
Gwangju No. 2 beltway lost an administrative suit recently. As a result, it had to alter the 
capital structure to recover the original low-interest debt at the beginning of the project
???
(Hankyoreh News, Mar.26.2013)36. The MRG Agreement has been financial burden to Korean 
government and periodically MRG has put pressure the government’s budget until now.
According to the ADB report (20011), “The government has tried to mitigate the financial
burden from its MRG commitments. One of most direct efforts is to consult with the project 
company and develop plans to increase revenue. Other efforts include preparing refinancing 
guidelines. When the project company refinances, the principle of a 50:50 share of
refinancing gains between the project company and the government is required in the annual 
PPP Basic Plan. In practice, the actual gain for the government varies depending upon the 
methods used for measuring the gain (ADB, 2011)37.”
[3] MRG’s Problems : FISCAL RISK & MORAL HAZARD
At the point of ‘uncertainty’, it is hard to estimate future demand. How can we recognize 
MRG level is low or high on the agreement. There are some problems to be expected from the 
MRG Agreement.
1) Fiscal Risk
MRG Agreement is positive for promoting and encouraging the private partners to
participate the national infrastructure projects at the point of transferring financial risk to the 
government. But the government takes most of the project risks from construction period to 
operation period. If the national budget paid extremely to subsidies for long-term, the 
government can’t avoid from the fiscal risk.
2) Moral Hazard Problem: MRG caused “Full-Stomached Grasshoppers”
???????????????????????????????????????????
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MRG Agreement pursues the social security to ensure and to promote the national 
infrastructure investment. But, MRG Agreement has possibility to discourage efforts to 
maximize revenue to the private partners called moral hazard. For example, in the port 
projects, the private port operators will not need to work to increase port traffic as minimum
revenue guarantee system paid regularly to fill the loss from the government. So, the private 
operators have possibility to abuse the MRG Agreement to get subsidies not becoming ‘a
diligent ant’ but pursuing ‘a full-stomached grasshopper’.
?
?
?
?
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?
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CHAPTER    V
Interview Regarding Korean Infrastructure Project
?
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Here is the list of the questionnaires applying on < Figure 3. Key Features on PPP-
enabling legislation by state > from question no.1-7.  And the questionnaires (No.1-7)
applied to < Figure 3. Key Features on PPP-enabling legislation by state > and my research 
questionnaires (No.8-10) were asked to 3 interviewees who have experienced in Korean
infrastructure development in private sector. 
Interviewee 1:  Joong Woo Kim, Deputy General Manager in Hana Daetoo Securities
(in charge of SOC Investment Division)
Interviewee 2:  Susan Kim, Project Manager Gail International 
(in charge of Incheon International Airport project)
Interviewee 3:  Hyun-Wook Park, Woori-Bank Investment Banking Division
The Answers are as follows:
< Table 19. Interviews Regarding Korean Infrastructure Development Environment > 
Questions Y/N The Details of Korean Legislation On Interviews
1 Solicited
&unsolicited 
proposals 
allowed
Yes Article 6
(Solicited Projects to be Deliberated by 
Committee)
The term “Solicited Projects of the 
specified scale as determined by the 
Presidential Decree or larger” in 
Article 8-2 (2) of the Act means 
Infrastructure Projects which require a 
total project cost. (The total project 
cost is calculated by Article 22 (1). 
The same shall apply here in forth.) of 
200 billion KRW or more. <Amended 
by Presidential Decree No. 17928, 
Feb. 24, 2003, Mar. 8, 2005>
Article 7
Interviewee 1: Yes
Interviewee 2: Yes
Interviewee 3: Yes
???
(Implementation Process for 
Unsolicited Projects Proposed by 
Private Sector) 
(1) A project proposal containing each 
of the following items shall be 
submitted to the Competent Authority 
when a party in the Private Sector 
intends to propose a project promoted 
by means of the private investment 
method in accordance with Article 9 
(1) of the Act. <Amended by 
Presidential Decree No. 17093, Dec. 
30, 2000, Mar. 8, 2005>
Source: ENFORCEMENT DECREE 
OF THE ACT ON PRIVATE 
PARTICIPATION IN ?
INFRASTRUCTURE (p53-54)
2 Local, state, 
or federal 
funds can be 
combined 
with private 
sectors fund
Yes Article 27
(Operation Standard of Management 
Institution) The Credit Guarantee 
Fund (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Management Institution”) under 
Article 30 (2) of the Act shall establish 
a standard for its work process to 
promote efficiency in the management 
of the Fund, and submit it to the 
Minister of Planning and Budget. 
<Amended by Presidential Decree No. 
16326, May 24, 1999
Article 28(Management of Fund) 
The term “other purposes as
determined by the Presidential Decree” 
in subparagraph 5 of Article 32 of the 
Act means one of the following 
purposes: 1.Deposit in financial 
institutions; 2.Purchase of bonds under 
subparagraphs 1 through 3 of Article 2 
(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 
or bonds guaranteed by the State or 
any financial institutions; 3. 
Underwriting or purchase of 
stocks(including investment 
certificates), debentures, or other 
securities as deemed by the Minister of 
Planning and Budget to be necessary; 
and 4. Other purposes which the 
Minister of Planning and Budget 
deems necessary for the 
Interviewee 1: Yes
Interviewee 2: Yes
Interviewee 3: Yes
???
implementation of PPI Projects.
Source: ENFORCEMENT DECREE 
OF THE ACT ON PRIVATE 
PARTICIPATION IN ?
INFRASTRUCTURE (p67)
3 Various kinds 
of 
procurements
are allowed 
for project 
delivery
Yes Interviewee 1: Yes
Interviewee 2: Yes
Interviewee 3: Yes
4 Long-term 
lease/franchis
es granted by 
the public 
sector for 
construction, 
operation,  
and 
maintenance
of toll 
facilities
Interviewee 1: Yes
(“It is different depends on 
the projects. long-term 
lease is possible”)
Interviewee 2: Yes
Interviewee 3: Yes
(“Possible. but would be 
reluctant to invest long-
term lease project)
5 Public sector 
has authority 
to lease toll 
revenue 
bonds or 
notes
Interviewee 1:
Yes(“Different depends on 
the projects.”)
Interviewee 2: Yes
Interviewee 3: Yes
6 Public sector 
agency can 
hire its own 
technical and 
legal 
consultants
Interviewee 1: Yes
Interviewee 2: Yes
Interviewee 3: Yes
7 Public sector 
outsources 
long-term 
operations 
and 
maintenance
and other 
asset
management 
duties to the 
private sector
Yes Article 24
(Registration of Management and
Operation Rights) 
The Decree on Registration of Port 
Facilities Management Right shall 
apply mutatis mutandis with regard to 
the registration under the provisions of 
Articles 26 (2) and 28 (1) of the Act. 
<Amended, Mar. 8, 2005> 
Article 25(Management and 
Maintenance of Facilities) 
The Competent Authority may establish 
and apply standards for the 
management and maintenance of the 
facilities under subparagraphs 1
through 3 of Article 4 of the Act 
during the free use period or 
ownership and profitable use period. 
Interviewee 1: Yes
Interviewee 2: Yes
Interviewee 3: Yes
???
<Amended, Mar. 8, 2005> 
(2) The Concessionaire of the facilities 
under paragraph (1) above shall notify 
a management and maintenance plan 
to the Competent Authority in 
accordance with the terms as 
determined by the Concession 
Agreement.
Source: ENFORCEMENT DECREE 
OF THE ACT ON PRIVATE 
PARTICIPATION IN ?
INFRASTRUCTURE (p66)
8 What is the 
optimal 
mixture of 
PPP to 
maximize the 
public 
purpose?( eq
uity, leading  
-role portion)
Interviewee 1:
“The mixtures are flexible based on the project’s characteristics.
Interviewee 2: “This is such a hard question to answer since it 
depends on the market and type of transaction. And it varies greatly 
due to market and type of transaction. You must tap the market at the 
time of the transaction. For the Gale Project, there was no mixture of 
equity. Just pure funding and finding was easy given the guarantee of 
the transaction. Full guarantee by POSCO.”
9 What was the 
most difficult 
factor to 
implement 
the PPP 
project?(poli
cy, law, 
procurement,
funding etc.)
Interviewee 1:
“On-time, On-budget is key criteria to make successful projects. But, 
frequent policy changes make hard to deliver the projects as usually 
infrastructure projects require long-term perspectives. So we should 
take authorities carry-out agreement risks. Negative perspectives 
about PPP’s project including price policy and default issues like the 
recent ‘Macquarie infra-fund case made barrier to implement make 
proposals and deliver projects.”
Interviewee 2:
“Depending on the project it varies. Projects where law is not clear, 
it will be need law. Funding is really never difficult element if the 
project is good.”
10 If you have 
any advices 
for PPPs for 
infrastructure
development 
in Korea, 
please leave 
message.
Interviewee 1: N/A
Interviewee 2: N/A
Interviewee 3: “A current issue regarding the failure of Macquarie 
infra-fund project enhanced major infrastructure investment, gave 
negative perspectives to Korean and Korean government. There is 
one more issue, if the private partner will progress the project such 
as operation, maintenance, the charging fees will be increased. 
Reflecting this public sentiment, SOC projects have barriers if project 
can’t guarantee the stable profits for certain for the private 
investors.”
Source: “The Details of Korean Legislation” based on “ ENFORCEMENT DECREE OF THE ACT ON 
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE” 38?
???????????????????????????????????????????
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion/ Suggestion
Limitation
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V. Conclusion/ Suggestion
?
??????????
Infrastructure development has been expected to generate substantial economic benefits 
and added-value on potential economic growth both in the developing countries and the 
developed countries. In Korea the remark size of volume of infrastructure investment since 
2000s on expressway, tunnels, high-speed KTX trains (230km/h) and internet-grid have 
contributed to Korean development in many ways. Those projects have been delivered with 
Public-Private Partnerships. At the aspect of transferring risks to the private sectors including 
financial risks PPPs enables infrastructure investment broadly and aggressively than 
conventional infrastructure development projects. 
Infrastructure development requires delicate analysis at the point of structuring 
partnership, forecasting demand, contract agreement, legislation, and financial analysis. As 
infrastructure development takes a long period from designing, building, financing, operating 
to maintaining, the projects are facing many risks. Especially, financial risks can be derived 
from the revenue sources that linked to the demand forecasting. At this point “Availability 
Payment Model” will be relatively stable method to implement infrastructure projects at the 
point of transferring demand-risk.
And to make possible effective PPPs’ projects there are several options should be 
accompanied.
[1] Small-scale infrastructure development project
[2] Stable payment
PPPs projects should be permitted the small-size scale of projects and non-complicated 
projects. Infrastructure project usually require higher transaction costs. As the higher 
transaction costs also reflect to the private partner’s price like a higher toll fee. Profit-seeking 
???
private partners usually want to compensate their investment from toll fees or use-fees of 
infrastructure facilities. Expected higher transaction cost make higher price, which this is not 
fulfill the public purpose, cheaper charge-oriented public service. Also charging infra-
facilities is sensitive issue related with national inflation.  The other way, if the public sector 
controls the limited maximum public charge, the private sector will be default or try to 
suggest the higher use-fees periodically to reimburse their higher transaction cost or maintain
their minimum profit from projects. This means large-scale size of infrastructure projects and 
complicated projects-cases are unsuitable to apply public-private partnerships. Therefore, 
PPPs are permitted on small-scale projects or, typically expected stable revenue projects to 
enable private partner solve the funding gap. This problem is actually what Korean 
government recently faces related with MRG(Minimum Revenue Guarantee) issue.  
Originally MRG system intended to encourage potential private partners to participate the 
national infrastructure projects, which have been financial burden to the Korean government 
causing fiscal risk. ?
??????????
1. Furthermore, Korean government should have financial stability, financial 
independence other words, “financial health” by itself for infrastructure investment. To 
realize the financial independence, the government should be considered the setup of 
government infrastructure fund such as pension fund and national bond to make the optimal 
mixture PPPs.  At the point of public sector’s perspective, transferring all of risks to the 
private sectors is ideal but, only PPPs method limited to be effective and to be successful 
infrastructure development. 
2.  To retain the stable revenue resources, various types of revenue resources should be 
innovated in marketing aspect. “Package ticket” can be one example. If the PPP’s roadway 
???
is the way going to amusement park, Everland, , mixture of tolls, parking fees, entrance fee, 1 
cup of drink can make more extra profit share to PPPs’ project. To give one more example, it
created more revenue such as “Package ticket for Incheon Airport Expressway”, mixture of 
tolls, parking fees, 1 bottle of water, and a discounted commission exchange. Likewise, the 
government needs to apply innovation to make new type of revenue resources systemically.
3. MRG(Minimum Revenue Guarantee) Agreement should be permitted for specific period to 
promote construction or to support emergency like disaster. MRG system pursues to 
encourage potential private partners to participate the national infrastructure projects. But 
now the Korean government faces extreme financial burden from MRG Agreement. Also, the 
government needs to study the various contract clauses and provision at the point of securing 
fiscal stability to apply the national infrastructure projects and it will contribute to maximize 
the value between the public sector and the private sector.
4. Systemically the government should dedicate on infrastructure-investment PPP’s
scenario manuals at the point of design, construction, maintenance and operation periodically
on a case by case. Infrastructure investment and development project require long life-cycle. 
The lesson recently we experienced from miss-forecasting demand on Macquarie 
Infrastructure Fund Projects should be re-studied and dig over not to repeat the same mistakes.
???
?? ????????
1. This research was ultimately to figure out the answer about the optimal mixture of Public -
Private Partnerships. To design the optimal mixture of PPPs’ infrastructure should be assume 
the micro-, macro-economic stability. 
2. I tried to have interviews with whom in charge of Macquarie Infrastructure Fund. But, it
was limited to access the sources and experience during the project period.
???
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PPPs for New Build Highway and Transit Facilities in the United States
(January 2005 – May 2008)
Project Location Status Type of PPP
TTC-35 Texas Concession Awarded
Concessionaire responsible for preparation of 
master development plan and for some or all 
of the development, design, construction, 
financing, operation and/or maintenance of 
an approximately 600-mile corridor from 
Mexico to Oklahoma
SH-130 
Segments 5&6 Texas Closed
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain approximately $1.3 billion 
facility as first segment of TTC-35 project
I-69/TTC Texas Preferred Bidder Selected
Concessionaire responsible for preparation of 
master development plan and for some or all 
of the development, design, construction, 
financing, operation and/or maintenance of 
an approximately 650-mile corridor from 
Mexico to Texarkana/Shreveport
I-635 Texas RFP Issued
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain tolled managed lanes in 
Dallas/Fort Worth area
North Tarrant 
Express Texas Bidders Shortlisted
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain tolled managed lanes and 
general lanes in North Tarrant County
DFW 
Connector Texas Bidders Shortlisted
Concession to develop, design, construct 
(and at TxDOT's sole option maintain) tolled 
managed lanes on the SH-114/SH-121 
corridor in Dallas/Fort Worth area
Capital 
Beltway HOT 
Lanes
Virginia Closed
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain HOT lanes on a 14-mile stretch 
of I-495 in northern Virginia
I-95/I-395 HOT 
Lanes Virginia
Interim Agreement 
Executed
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain HOT lanes on a 56-mile stretch 
of I-95/I-395 in northern Virginia
US Route 460 Virginia Bidders Shortlisted
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain $1 billion to $2 billion 
improvements to Route 460 in southeastern 
Virginia
Midtown 
Corridor 
Tunnel
Virginia Solicitation Issued
Concession to modify the existing tunnel 
linking Portsmouth and Norfolk, construct a 
new parallel tunnel and extend freeway
Port of Miami 
Tunnel Project Florida
Preferred Bidder 
Selected
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain a tunnel providing access from 
the Port of Miami to the Florida mainland
I-595
Improvements Florida Bidders Shortlisted
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain improvements on the I-595 
corridor between I-75 and I-95
First Coast Florida RFQ Issued Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
???
PPPs for New Build Highway and Transit Facilities in the United States
(January 2005 – May 2008)
Project Location Status Type of PPP
Outer Beltway and maintain a limited access toll facility 
outside of Jacksonville
Northwest 
Corridor Georgia
Development
Agreement Executed
Concession to develop, design and construct 
express toll lanes, BRT lanes and possibly 
TOT lanes on I-75 and I-575 northwest of 
Atlanta
I-285
Northwest 
TOT Lanes
Georgia Evaluation of Proposers
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain TOT lanes on I-285 and I-20
northwest and west of Atlanta
GA-400
Crossroads 
Region
Georgia Evaluation of Proposal
Concession to design, construct, operate and 
maintain HOT lanes on GA-400 north of 
Atlanta
I-20 Managed 
Lanes Georgia Pre-Solicitation
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain two managed lanes on the I-20
corridor east of Atlanta
Missouri Safe 
& Sound 
Bridge 
Program
Missouri Preferred Bidder Selected
Concession to upgrade, finance, operate and 
maintain more than 800 bridges in Missouri
Knik Arm 
Crossing 
Project
Alaska Bidders Shortlisted
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain a bridge connecting Anchorage 
with Mat-Su borough
The Airport 
Parkway Mississippi RFQ Issued
Concession to develop, build, finance, 
operate and maintain a parkway from 
downtown Jackson to the airport
Oakland 
Airport 
Connector
California RFP Issued Concession to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the Oakland Airport Connector
Denver RTD Colorado RFQ Expected
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain the East, Gold Line and 
Commuter Line Maintenance Facility in the 
Denver area
Metro 
Solutions 
Phase II
Texas Bidders Shortlisted
Facility Provider will be responsible for design 
and construction of civil works; furnishing and 
installation of equipment; initial operations 
and maintenance; and financing services for 
Light Rail projects in Houston
I-73 South Carolina
Request for Conceptual 
Proposals
Concession to design, build, finance, operate 
and maintain the 80-mile portion of I-73
connecting Myrtle Beach with the North 
Carolina border
Mid-Currituck 
Bridge
North 
Carolina Bidders Shortlisted
Concession for new 7-mile bridge over 
Currituck Sound connecting mainland and the 
Currituck County outer Banks south of 
Corolla
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Source: Florida Department of Transportation, U.S.
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Public-Private Partnership: a contractual agreement formed between public and private
sector partners, which allows more private sector participation than is traditional. The
agreements usually involve a government agency contracting with a private company to
renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a facility or system. While the public
sector usually retains ownership in the facility or system, the private party will be given
additional decision rights in determining how the project or task will be completed. The term
public-private partnership defines an expansive set of relationships from relatively simple
contracts (e.g., A+B contracting), to development agreements that can be very complicated
and technical.
http://www.gao.gov/special/pubs/Gg99071.pdf
Shadow Tolling: Shadow tolls are per vehicle amounts paid to a facility operator by a third
party such as a sponsoring governmental entity. Shadow tolls are not paid by facility users.
Shadow toll amounts paid to a facility operator vary by contract and are typically based upon
the type of vehicle and distance traveled.
Tolling: the process of collecting revenue whereby road users are charged a fee per roadway
use. Tolls may be collected on a flat-fee basis, time basis, or distance basis and may vary by
type of vehicle
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Developer Finance
The private party finances the construction or expansion of a public facility in exchange for 
the right to build residential housing, commercial stores, and/or industrial facilities at the site. 
The private developer contributes capital and may operate the facility under the oversight of 
the government. The developer gains the right to use the facility and may receive future 
income from user fees. While developers may in rare cases build a facility, more typically 
they are charged a fee or required to purchase capacity in an existing facility. This payment is 
used to expand or upgrade the facility. Developer financing arrangements are often called 
capacity credits, impact fees, or extractions. Developer financing may be voluntary or 
involuntary depending on the specific local circumstances
EUL: Enhanced Use Leasing or Underutilized Asset
An EUL is an asset management program in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that can 
include a variety of different leasing arrangements (e.g. lease/develop/operate, 
build/develop/operate). EULs enable the VA to long-term lease VA-controlled property to the 
private sector or other public entities for non-VA uses in return for receiving fair 
consideration (monetary or in-kind) that enhances VA’s mission or programs.
LDO or BDO: Lease-Develop-Operate or Build-Develop-Operate
Under these partnerships arrangements, the private party leases or buys an existing facility from a 
public agency; invests its own capital to renovate, modernize, and/or expand the facility; and then 
operates it under a contract with the public agency. A number of different types of municipal transit 
facilities have been leased and developed under LDO and BDO arrangements.
Lease/Purchase
A lease/purchase is an installment-purchase contract. Under this model, the private sector 
finances and builds a new facility, which it then leases to a public agency. The public agency 
makes scheduled lease payments to the private party. The public agency accrues equity in the 
facility with each payment. At the end of the lease term, the public agency owns the facility 
or purchases it at the cost of any remaining unpaid balance in the lease. Under this 
arrangement, the facility may be operated by either the public agency or the private developer 
during the term of the lease. Lease/purchase arrangements have been used by the General 
Services Administration for building federal office buildings and by a number of states to 
build prisons and other correctional facilities.
Sale/Leaseback
This is a financial arrangement in which the owner of a facility sells it to another entity, and 
subsequently leases it back from the new owner. Both public and private entities may enter into 
sale/leaseback arrangements for a variety of reasons. An innovative application of the 
sale/leaseback technique is the sale of a public facility to a public or private holding company for 
the purposes of limiting governmental liability under certain statues. Under this arrangement, the 
government that sold the facility leases it back and continues to operate it.
Tax-Exempt Lease
???
A public partner finances capital assets or facilities by borrowing funds from a private investor or 
financial institution. The private partner generally acquires title to the asset, but then transfers it to 
the public partner either at the beginning or end of the lease term. The portion of the lease payment 
used to pay interest on the capital investment is tax exempt under state and federal laws. Tax-
exempt leases have been used to finance a wide variety of capital assets, ranging from computers to 
telecommunication systems and municipal vehicle fleets.
Turnkey
A public agency contracts with a private investor/vendor to design and build a complete 
facility in accordance with specified performance standards and criteria agreed to between the 
agency and the vendor. The private developer commits to build the facility for a fixed price 
and absorbs the construction risk of meeting that price commitment. Generally, in a turnkey 
transaction, the private partners use fast-track construction techniques (such as design-build) 
and are not bound by traditional public sector procurement regulations. This combination 
often enables the private partner to complete the facility in significantly less time and for less 
cost than could be accomplished under traditional construction techniques.
In a turnkey transaction, financing and ownership of the facility can rest with either the public 
or private partner. For example, the public agency might provide the financing, with the 
attendant costs and risks. Alternatively, the private party might provide the financing capital, 
generally in exchange for a long-term contract to operate the facility.
Source: The National Council for Public Private Partnership,
http://www.ncppp.org/ppp-basics/types-of-partnerships
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Questions Please share your experience or related 
issues.
1 Solicited and unsolicited proposals allowed in 
Korea (Yes / No)
2 Local, state, or federal funds can be combined 
with private sectors fund (Yes / No)
3 Various kinds of procurements are allowed for 
project delivery. (Yes / No)
4 Long-term lease/franchises granted by the public 
sector for construction, operation, and 
maintenance of toll facilities. (Yes / No)
5 Public sector has authority to lease toll revenue 
bonds or notes. (Yes / No)
6 Public sector agency can hire its own technical 
and legal consultants. (Yes / No)
7 Public sector outsources long-term operations 
and maintenance and other asset management 
duties to the private sector. (Yes / No)
8 What is the optimal mixture of PPP to maximize 
the public purpose? (equity, leading role portion)
9 What was the most difficult factor to implement 
the PPP project?(policy, law, procurement,
funding etc.)  
10 If you have any comments or advices for PPPs 
for infrastructures development in Korea, please 
leave message.
